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AbstrAct
On 16 May 2017, Ecuador terminated all the 16 Ecuadorian Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties (BITs) still remaining in force.  This decision was the end 
of  a longer process that aimed to disengage the South American state from 
the international investment regime, a process begun nearly a decade earlier, 
with the drafting of  a new constitution in 2008, one that contained an arti-
cle prohibiting the state from giving consent to investment arbitration. The 
article argues that it was not the 2017 decision itself, but the different erratic 
legal steps that led to Ecuador’s poor performance in terms of  FDI policy. 
These steps included the initial and unfortunate draft of  a constitutional 
provision, the timing involved in re-evaluating this constitutional decision 
so many years later, and in general the lack of  any pre-established course 
for action during this process. In this light, the article further claims that an 
analysis of  the Ecuadorian experience can contribute to a better understan-
ding of  how the constitutional sphere can best interact with international in-
vestment law, potentially by applying specific principles of  investment rather 
than prohibitions on constitutional texts.
Keywords: Ecuador, International Investment Law, legitimacy, Latin America.
resumo
Em 16 de maio de 2017, o Equador terminou todos os seus 16 investi-
mentos bilaterais de investimentos. Esta decisão foi o fim de um processo 
mais longo que visava desvincular o Estado sul-americano do regime de 
investimento internacional, um processo iniciado quase uma década antes, 
com a elaboração de uma nova constituição em 2008, constituição esta que 
continha um artigo proibindo o Estado de dar consentimento à arbitragem 
de investimento. O artigo argumenta que não é a própria decisão de 2017 
que causou a performance fraca do Equador em termos de investimentos 
diretos estrangeiro, mas os diferentes passos legais erráticos, incluindo a má 
elaboração de uma disposição constitucional, o tempo envolvido na reava-
liação da decisão constitucional tantos anos mais tarde e, em geral, a falta de 
um curso de ação pré-estabelecido durante este processo que levou ao mau 
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desempenho do Equador em termos de sua política de 
IDE. Nesta luz, o artigo afirma ainda que uma análise 
da experiência equatoriana pode contribuir para uma 
melhor compreensão de como o âmbito constitucional 
pode interagir melhor com o direito de investimento 
internacional, potencialmente aplicando princípios es-
pecíficos de investimento ao invés de proibições sobre 
textos constitucionais.
Palavras-chave: Equador; legitimidade; direito dos in-
vestimentos
1. IntroductIon
On 16 May 2017, the President of  Ecuador signed 
executive decrees1  terminating all of  the 16 Ecuadorian 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) still remaining in 
force.  This decision was the end of  a longer process 
that aimed to disengage the South American state from 
the international investment regime, a process begun by 
the same president nearly a decade earlier, when his po-
litical movement moved forward with the drafting and, 
in 2008, approval of  a new constitution that contained 
an article prohibiting the state from consenting to in-
vestment arbitration. 
After this constitutional prohibition went into for-
ce, the ICSID convention was denounced, and 9 out 
1   Presidential Decree No 1399 Denunciation of  the Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential 
Decree No 1400 Denunciation of  the Federal Republic of  Germany 
-Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1401, Denun-
ciation of  People´s Republic of  China - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; 
Presidential Decree No 1402, Denunciation of  Swiss Confederation 
- Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1403, Denunci-
ation of  Republic of  Chile - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential 
Decree No 1404, Denunciation of  Kingdom of  Sweden - Ecuador 
BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1405, Denunciation of  
French Republic - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree 
No 1406, Denunciation of  Kingdom of  the Netherlands - Ecuador 
BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1407, Denunciation of  
Republic of  Venezuela - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential 
Decree No 1408, Denunciation of  Argentine Republic - Ecuador 
BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1409, Denunciation of  
Canada - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1410, 
Denunciation of  United States of  America - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 
2017; Presidential Decree No 1411, Denunciation of  Kingdom of  
Spain - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1412, 
Denunciation of  Republic of  Peru - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; 
Presidential Decree No 1413, Denunciation of  Republic of  Bolivia 
- Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017; Presidential Decree No 1414, Denun-
ciation of  Republic of  Italian Republic - Ecuador BIT, 16 May 2017.
of  26 Ecuadorian ‘in force’ BITs2 were terminated in 
2008 while the remaining 17 BITs underwent a tangled 
process of  termination. This process included: different 
and sometimes contradictory judgements by the Ecua-
dorian constitutional court regarding the compatibility 
of  BITs with the new constitution; approval processes 
for the denunciation of  the treaties by the legislative 
branch; the formation in 2013 of  a special commission, 
composed of  high officials along with a group of  inter-
national experts, to audit the international investment 
law regime; and finally, the termination of  the remai-
ning BITs in the year 2017.
Ecuador’s decision and the long road taken to ter-
minate the totality of  its BITs constitutes a unique case 
for studying the legitimacy of  the international invest-
ment regime because Ecuador is one of  the few deve-
loping countries that has taken the radical decision to 
terminate all of  its connections with the international 
investment regime. In addition, Ecuador was one of  the 
first countries, along with Venezuela3 and Bolivia4, to 
introduce an express constitutional clause to forbid the 
state from entering into such agreements. 
In this context, Ecuador’s termination of  BITs in 
2017 ought to be analyzed not as a new development 
or resistance to investment arbitration, but rather as the 
last in a series of  chaotic steps that severed the country 
from the Investment Regime as way to resist to interna-
tional economic structures, perceived to be ‘neoliberal’. 
In consequence, the steps taken starting from the article 
inserted in the constitution of  2008 could be one, if  
not the main cause, of  the terrible performance of  the 
Ecuadorian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy in 
the last years. 
The state of  Ecuadorian FDI policy is evident now 
since the country is one of  the last destinations for in-
2  Ecuador negotiated 31 known BITs, from those: 1) the 1965 
Ecuador - Germany (BundesrepubIik Deutschland) was replaced 
in 1996 with a new one;  2) the Ecuador- Russia BIT (1996) was 
never ratified by Russia; 3) The Ecuador-Panama BIT  (1996) never 
entered into force; 4) the Ecuador-Costa Rica BIT (2001) never en-
tered into force; 5) The Ecuador-Egypt BIT  according with the 
information made public by Ecuador was  be concluded in 1995 for 
no renovation of  the parties. Therefore, in 2008 Ecuador had only 
26 ‘in force’ BITs. See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA and 
CAITISA, “Informe Ejecutivo de la Auditoría Integral Ciudadana 
de Los Tratados de Protección Recíproca de Inversiones y del Siste-
ma de Arbitraje en Materia de Inversiones en Ecuador,” [CAITISIA 
Report]  (Quito, Ecuador 2017), at 15-16.
3  Art 151 of  Venezuela’s Constitution (1999).
4  Art 366 of  Bolivia’s Constitution (2007).
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vestment flow in Latin America, it has been one of  the 
most frequently sued states in investment arbitration, 
and in general has been outperformed by its neighbors5 
in terms of  attracting foreign investment. 
On these grounds, I argue here that it was not the 
2017 decision itself, but the different erratic legal steps, 
including the poor drafting of  the constitutional provi-
sion, the confusing reasons given for a series of  cons-
titutional judgements, the timing involved in re-evalua-
ting the constitutional decision so many years later, and 
in general the lack of  a pre-established course of  action 
during this process, that hurt Ecuadorian performance 
in terms of  its FDI policy. In this light, one could also 
argue that the Ecuadorian experience is a key case study 
for those studying the interplay between constitutional 
law and international investment law on the one hand 
and the alleged constitutionalization of  international 
investment law on the other. I further claim that speci-
fic principles of  investment should be used rather than 
prohibitions on constitutional texts.
This analysis proceeds as follows: Section 1 will 
briefly describe the different legal steps undertaken by 
Ecuador to effectively disconnect itself  from the regime, 
commenting on the ambiguities of  the constitutional 
provision (2008) and the distinct reasons expressed in 
the judgments of  the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court 
(2010-2013). Then, Section 2 will focus on the termina-
tion of  the remaining BITs and the very critical report 
of  the commission created by the executive branch whi-
ch formed the basis for this decision. This section will 
analyze how the tone, structure and timing of  the report 
functioned as a curtain to hide the poor performance 
of  Ecuadorian FDI policy over the last decade. Finally, 
in the last section, I will further argue that we can learn 
from the Ecuadorian experience that any use of  the 
constitutional sphere to interact with investment arbi-
5  In the last years, the flows of  FDI into Ecuador have been con-
siderably less than those for its two neighbors, Colombia and Peru, 
countries that also share similar economic and social characteristics. 
In the period 2006 - 2011, the flows of  FDI into Ecuador (2,639 
USD MM) were about 5 % of  FDI in Colombia (55,414 USD MM) 
and 7% of  FDI in Perú (38,109 USD MM). In the period 2012 - 
2016, the FDI of  Ecuador (4,133 USD MM), was about 6% of  FDI 
in Colombia (72,736 USD MM), and 10% of  FDI in Peru (41,164 
USD MM). See the information available in:   UNCTAD WIR17 
World Investment Report 2017: UNCTAD WIR16 World Invest-
ment Report 2016; UNCTAD WIR15 World Investment Report 
2015; UNCTAD WIR14 World Investment Report 2014: UNC-
TAD WIR13 World Investment Report 2013; UNCTAD WIR12 
World Investment Report 2012.
tration should be based on the insertion of  principles of  
investment rather than rules or prohibitions.
2. the long roAd of ecuAdor bIt 
termInAtIons
2.1 The Constitutional Assembly and article 422 
of the Ecuadorian Constitution 
In 2008, in the town of  Montecristi, Ecuador, a 
constitutional assembly drafted the twentieth Ecuado-
rian constitution. Article 422 of  the new Ecuadorian 
Constitution, a very extended constitutional text com-
posed of  444 articles, aims to disengage the country 
from the international investment law regime. The text 
of  the article is the following:
No international treaties or instruments may be 
concluded where the Ecuadorian State yields its 
sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration 
entities, in disputes involving contracts or of  a 
commercial nature, between the State and natural 
persons or legal entities. 
The treaties and international instruments that 
provide for the settlement of  disputes between 
States and citizens of  Latin America by regional 
arbitration entities or by jurisdictional organizations 
designated by the signatory countries are exempt 
from this prohibition. […]6
As pointed out by the Argentinean jurist Gargare-
lla, the constitutional changes effected in Latin Ameri-
ca since the late twentieth century represent a response 
to two important kinds of  historical event: the grave 
human rights abuses committed by dictatorial govern-
ments, and the social crisis which is, in part, a result of  
the so called ‘neoliberal’ structural adjustment programs 
during the 1990s. Taking this into account, article 422 
of  the Ecuadorian constitution, could also be explained 
as a reaction to economic governance structures as will 
be further explained in Section 3. 
The drafting of  any important legal text and espe-
cially the constitution of  a country demands special 
care in order to avoid ambiguities that could obstruct 
the fulfillment of  the very collective choices that should 
be implemented. This is precisely the case with the text 
of  article 422 of  the Ecuadorian constitution, as has 
6  Author’s translation of  Art. 422. 
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already been commented on in the literature7,  because 
it contains at least three important ambiguities that ou-
ght to be noted: About the subject, the object and the 
temporal effect of  the constitutional provision. 
The first ambiguity is related to the scope of  the 
prohibition against yielding state sovereignty to inter-
national arbitration for disputes of  a ‘commercial natu-
re’ [indole commercial] without directly making use of  the 
word ‘investment.’ The use of  the phrase ‘of  a commer-
cial nature’ implies a different set of  economic transac-
tions that are governed by different regimes (i.e. WTO 
law) on the international level. 
 The second ambiguity is in the object of  the pro-
hibition, since the article makes reference to “No in-
ternational treaties or instruments may be concluded” 
[No se podrán celebrar tratados o instrumentos] where it is not 
clear if  the prohibition covers investment “contracts” 
as well. Once again, regardless of  the assessment of  the 
benefits of  the measure, the drafters of  the constitution 
could have directly included more specific words such 
as “contracts” or “investment” in the wording of  the 
article, if  their intention was to completely disengage 
the state from the investment regime. 
Finally, a third ambiguity results from the silen-
ce throughout the constitutional text on the temporal 
effect of  such strong decisions, since this prohibits the 
cession of  sovereignty, but does not specify the con-
sequences for investment treaties already in force. It is 
worth noting that the Ecuadorian constitution includes 
30 temporal clauses to regulate the transition between 
the new and old constitutions, but in none of  these spe-
cifies what should be done with the investment treaties 
already in force. From the discussions of  the constitu-
tional assembly, it appears that the drafters where not 
even aware exactly what treaties the Ecuadorian state 
was party to. On this point, it would have sufficed if  the 
Ecuadorian drafters had simply included a text manda-
ting the re-negotiation or termination of  valid treaties.  
The described ambiguities show that the drafters of  
the constitution did not envision a clear legal course of  
action for how the termination process should proceed, 
beyond specific references to the Occidental (la OXY) 
7  For a clear analysis of  the text see Katia Fach Gómez, Ecua-
dor’s Attainment of  the Sumak Kawsay and the Role Assigned to 
International Arbitration (4 August 2011), available electronically 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1904715 or http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.1904715
case lost by Ecuador. This case was the first of  two-im-
portant arbitral processes between the south American 
state and the Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company, a corporation incorporated in the state of  
California, US. The first Occidental award related to a 
participation contract with Petroecuador, a State-owned 
corporation, to undertake exploration and production 
of  oil. The conflict started when the Ecuadorian tax 
authority (SRI) denied applications for VAT tax refunds 
and required the return of  previous reimbursements8. 
In 2004, an arbitral Tribunal found that Ecuador had 
breached the national treatment and fair and equitable 
standards contained in the USA-Ecuador BIT9.
The case gained public attention, despite its highly 
technical nature, because it was believed to be a ‘tax 
matter’ that ought to fall within Ecuadorian sovereign 
competences. For this reason, Ecuador tried to set aside 
the award in the UK courts and lost its last appeal on 
March 2007, months before the constitutional process 
started. The issue was therefore still on the minds of  
the Ecuadorian drafters10.  
Besides the mention of  this case, the discussions 
reflected on the transcripts of  the Ecuadorian cons-
titutional assembly are remarkable for the absence of  
any reference to empirical studies that could shed some 
light on the possible outcomes and impact of  the inser-
tion of  article 422. Even more, a clear complaint was 
made by one of  the Ecuadorian drafters who strongly 
denounced the lack of  time given to properly study the 
provision, saying: ‘It cannot be analyzed [referring to 
a group of  articles including 422]. If  I wanted to talk 
about all the articles, I would need exactly fifteen secon-
ds for each of  them and that is impossible’11. Since, the 
use of  a constitutional text implies long term use and 
impact, one would have expected a deeper analysis to be 
conducted when the prohibition was introduced. 
8  Occidental Exploration and Production Company v the Republic of  Ec-
uador, (2004), paras 1-6.
9  Ibid para 200.
10  See Ecuador Constitutional Assembly [Asamblea Constituy-
ente Ecuador] Acta 038 Sumario - 22 April 2008; [Asamblea Con-
stituyente Ecuador] Acta 050- A, 16 May 2008. 
11  Personal translation of  the of  the speech pronounced by 
drafter Diana Acosta, Transcripts of  the discussions of  article 422, 
Asamblea Constituyente Ecuador [Ecuador Constitutional Assem-
bly]  Act No 050- A  -16 May 2008.
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2.2 The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court 
Judgements 
Ecuador concluded in 1965 its first BIT with the 
Federal Republic of  Germany12 (BundesrepubIik Deuts-
chland), and since then signed at least 30 BITs more 
and the ICSID convention. When the constitutional 
assembly drafted article 422 in 2008, with the inten-
tion of  disengaging the country from the international 
investment regime, Ecuador was a part of  26 bilateral 
investment treaties13. Since then, the country began the 
process of  the denunciation of  nine BITs using the pre-
vious constitutional rules (constitution of  1998), which 
allowed the executive branch to terminate them directly 
without the consent of  the parliament14. For the remai-
ning seventeen treaties, the process of  termination be-
gan using the rules of  the new 2008 constitution which 
mandated that the newly created constitutional court of  
Ecuador should make a determination as to the compa-
tibility of  the international treaties before denunciation. 
As one of  the first constitutional judges to be con-
fronted with the legitimacy of  investment arbitration, 
the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court had the unique 
opportunity to shape not only legal discourse in the 
field, but also to solve the practical problems that arose 
from the ambiguities of  article 422. 
However, the outcome was a set of  diverse judg-
ments issued by the Ecuadorian court on the same 
topic. In the period 2010-2013 the court produced a 
series of  decisions regarding the constitutional analysis 
of  each of  the remaining BITs in the process of  being 
terminated. Yet, despite the fact that this was the same 
constitutional court interpreting the same article in re-
gard to the same type of  similar investment treaties, the 
court couldn’t produce a uniform line of  reasoning for 
the various judgements and instead used different argu-
ments and even arrived at different conclusions.
First, in 2010, a group of  sentences contained a 
more radical argumentation, where the court not only 
studied the compatibility of  the BIT with the constitu-
tion but adopted a defensive stance towards the invest-
12  See the text available electronically at http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/
13  See n. ii
14  CAITISA, “Informe Ejecutivo de la Auditoría Integral Ciu-
dadana de los Tratados de Protección Recíproca de Inversiones y 
del Sistema de Arbitraje en Materia de Inversiones en Ecuador” 
[CAITISA Report]  (Quito, Ecuador 2017), at 24.
ment regime. Specifically, on the Ecuador–Great Britain 
BIT judgement, the Ecuadorian Court appeared to be 
responding or interacting with a non-determined inter-
locutor in its judgement, one that apparently claimed 
that the Ecuadorian system is slow and immoral, but 
without specifying who had made these claims nor in 
what context they were made. The words of  the court 
were the following:
“In essence, through these instruments [referring to 
BITs], the Ecuadorian State has ceded the jurisdiction 
of  national judges in disputes or conflicts, at the 
international level. It has been argued that our legal 
system is neither reliable nor suitable, that it is slow 
and immoral, and it has been argued that external 
arbitration is the ideal mechanism for resolving 
conflicts or differences […]15
In addition, the court raises various additional ideas 
in a few sentences regarding the real benefits for Ecua-
dorian investors included in the BITs, the facts that the 
country had not negotiated the treaties properly, and 
that arbitration does not represent collective interest.16 
Also in 2010, another group of  decisions adopted 
a different, more balanced argumentative approach, 
by analyzing in a more structured manner whether the 
whole text of  the BITs was compatible with the new 
constitution. For instance, the France-Ecuador BIT 
judgement analyses the compatibility of  each of  the 
treaty clauses with the new constitution. In this deve-
lopment, the court establishes that all the substantive 
standards of  the treaty are in accordance with the Cons-
titution. Even more, it determines that the Fair and 
Equitable standard —the most controversial and widely 
used standard in investment arbitration litigation — is 
compatible with at least three articles of  the new Ecua-
dorian constitution.17 Finally, following this reasoning, 
the Court determined in the case analyzing the Ecua-
dor- France BIT that only those articles containing the 
investor-state arbitration clause were contrary to article 
422 of  the Ecuadorian constitution. The Court further 
explained that it was necessary to partially denounce the 
treaties, and even reminded the legislative branch that 
it was of  ‘vital importance’18 to establish mechanisms for 
15 Ecuador - Great Britan BIT, Dictamen No 020-10-Dti-Cc Caso No 
0008-10-Ti, (2010), at 25
16  One of  the sources used by the Court is the website www.
quiendebeaquin.org, see footnote 14, on ibid. at 24.
17  It mentions that the FET is compatible with articles:  284.8, 
339, 416.12 and 321. See Francia - Ecuador BIT, Dictamen No 
031-10-Dti-Cc Caso No 0007-10-Ti, (2010), at 21.
18  See ibid at 27.
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dispute resolution, which must be subject to the com-
mon agreement of  the contracting parties. 
Since neither the Vienna Convention of  the law of  
the treaties, nor the Ecuador – France BIT specified a 
process for the denunciation of  just part of  a treaty, the 
sentence of  the Court could have been understood not 
as a mandate to directly terminate the BIT but rather as 
a mandate to renegotiate its terms.
Finally, in 2013 the last group of  decisions regarding 
the remaining BITS were drafted and here again there 
were two types of  approaches to article 422, those that 
were more critical and those that were more balanced. 
For instance, in the judgment on the Spain–Ecuador 
BIT, the court concluded that the investor-state clause 
was incompatible with the constitution, but also stated 
as a reason for its decision that arbitral tribunals, wi-
thout specifying which ones19, did not respect tax sove-
reignty and thus affected the ‘national interest’20, justi-
fying the denunciation of  the treaty. 
In contrast, in the Argentina – Ecuador BIT judge-
ment, the Ecuadorian court determined that the treaty 
was incompatible with the new Constitution, but unlike 
the previous cases did not mention the termination of  
all the agreements and expressly mandated that the ‘pu-
blic bodies concerned’21 had to renegotiate the articles 
that contained the dispute resolution mechanisms. 
2.3 The CAITISA report and the 2017 BIT 
terminations 
In May 2013, when the last set of  decisions of  the 
Ecuadorian constitutional court were being made, the 
president of  Ecuador, issued an executive decree22 that 
constituted the ‘Commission for the Integral Citizens 
Audit of  the Treaties for the Protection of  Investment 
and the Investment Arbitration System’ [Comisión para 
la Auditoría Integral Ciudadana de los Tratados de Protección 
19  Probably in reference to the Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v the Republic of  Ecuador, (2004). 
20  España - Ecuador BIT, Dictamen No 010-13-Dti-Cc, Caso No 0010-
11-Ti Corte Constitucional del Ecuador, (2013), at 15.
21  The original Spanish text of  the sentence is the following: “En 
consecuencia, corresponderá a los órganos públicos correspondientes renegociar 
el contenido declarado incompatible con la Constitución de la República, a fin 
de que las partes determinen otros mecanismos de solución de las diferencias, 
acordes con los preceptos constitucionales” Argentina- Ecuador Bit Dictamen 
No 0003-013-Dti-Cc, Caso No 0009-10-Ti, (2013), at 21.
22  Executive Decree No 1506, President of  Ecuador, 6 May 
2013,  (2013).
Recíproca de Inversiones y del Sistema de Arbitraje en Materia de 
Inversiones] (CAITISA). This Commission was compo-
sed of  nine experts (eight international and one Ecua-
dorian) along with four high officials of  the Executive 
branch representing the Ecuadorian government. 
Two hypotheses could explain the formation of  
CAITISA. The first is that Ecuador’s government was 
not sure if  the decisions taken on the BITs were ap-
propriate, simply didn’t know what to do with them or 
was honestly seeking information to re-assess the con-
sequence of  distancing itself  from the regime. 
The second hypothesis is that the Ecuadorian go-
vernment was convinced that it should disengage from 
the Regime, but desperately needed additional ‘good 
reasons’ to justify its policy choices against this regi-
me, both internally and externally. Put more concrete-
ly, Ecuador might have been planning to replicate the 
strategy it used to reduce its public debt in 2007 and 
2008, as stated in the same report of  CAITISA23, when 
it created a similar entity to determine that the public 
debt was ‘illegitimate’ in order to push bond holders to 
renegotiate a discount on the debt. 
This second hypothesis makes more sense conside-
ring that just a few months before creating the CAI-
TISA commission, on October 2012, Ecuador was 
notified about the award in its second case against Oc-
cidental, where it was ordered to pay the biggest sum 
of  money ever paid to any investor to date. 24 So, while 
Ecuador was creating CAITISA, it was at the same time 
starting to litigate the annulment process of  the Occi-
dental II award. In this scenario, Ecuador needed ‘good 
reasons’ to resist the authority of  the different invest-
ment arbitration process. ‘Good reasons’ that could not 
be found either in the discussions of  article 422, nor in 
the contradictory statements made by the Ecuadorian 
Constitutional Court regarding the same article.
In May 2017, the CAITISA commission presented 
its report about the investment regime and it became 
one of  the main reasons included in the recitals of  each 
of  the sixteen decrees cited by the Ecuadorian president 
to justify the termination of  the remaining BITS.
This report presents historical information on how 
Ecuador entered the regime by signing a series of  bi-
23  CAITISA Report,  supra n. xiv, at 12.
24  Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v The Republic of  Ecuador (Icsid Case No. Arb/06/11), (2012).
M
U
Ñ
O
Z
, J
os
e 
G
us
ta
vo
 P
rie
to
. E
cu
ad
or
’s 
20
17
 te
rm
in
at
io
n 
of
 tr
ea
tie
s: 
H
ow
 n
ot
 to
 e
xi
t t
he
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t r
eg
im
e. 
Re
vi
st
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 1
78
-1
91
185
lateral investment treaties in the nineties, as well as in-
formation on the different cases where the state was a 
responded state. In addition, it contains a strong criti-
que of  the legitimacy and legality of  the International 
Investment Regime. In this regard, the report includes 
legal, sociological, moral and even utilitarian criticisms 
of  the international investment regime that had appea-
red in the literature over the preceding years and adap-
ted these to the Ecuadorian experience. 
These very critical remarks can be summarized as 
follows: The BITs signed by Ecuador were poorly or 
not at all negotiated25 and  they lacked internal debate 
prior to their ratification26. In addition, the report clai-
ms that these treaties introduced a ‘biased’ adjudication 
system that has since caused serious economic damage 
to the country in terms of  various awards granted on 
‘tendentious’ and ‘unjust’27 grounds. Finally, the report 
argues that in any case, these treaties did not fullfil their 
main function28 which was to attract Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI) to the host state. 
It further argued that the small amounts of  FDI that 
entered the country, not only were inefficient with res-
pect to its development aims 29  but also had an adverse 
impact on  human rights terms and the environment30 
With this strong rhetoric, the report justified a series 
of  recommendations, most remarkably that the trea-
ties must be terminated and new more balanced ones 
should be negotiated. The report does not provide a 
particular draft model of  an Ecuadorian BIT treaty, but 
it does provide a series of  recommendations31 to follow 
for its elaboration, which move in the same direction as 
the ‘New Generation of  Investment Policies’ developed 
within the 2015 multilateral framework of  UNCTAD32.
The report offers concrete historical information 
concerning the way that the Ecuadorian state had ente-
red into the investment regime, by examining the phase 
of  negotiation and ratification of  the different invest-
ment treaties made in the nineties. Since it has been a 
common assumption in the international investment 
25  CAITISA Report,  supra n. xiv, at 15.
26  Ibid at 16-17.
27  Ibid at 50 – 62, at 94. 
28  Ibid at 63-65.
29  Ibid at 66-70.
30  Ibid at 71-85.
31  Ibid at 100 -108.
32  See Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Develop-
ment (UNCTAD, 2015).
field33 that developing countries understood the pos-
sible costs of  Investment agreements, these findings 
could shed more light on the truly naive way in which 
developing countries entered the international invest-
ment regime in the nineties 
In this sense, the argument made in the report is that 
the Ecuadorian State did not negotiate, and insufficien-
tly debated the content of  the BITS. On the one hand, 
regarding negotiation, the CAITISA commission affir-
med that treaties were not submitted to a process of  ne-
gotiation ‘as such’34 since the Ecuadorian officers of  the 
previous governments did not assess the consequences 
of  the treaties. On the other hand, concerning the ra-
tification processes, the report affirms that the treaties 
did not undergo a proper legislative debate or that this 
debate did not take place at all. For example, it presents 
the curious case of  seven treaties that were approved on 
the same day by the Ecuadorian parliament35.  
Despite the fact that this information illustrates a 
solid point supporting one of  the criticisms of  invest-
ment arbitration, it is still not clear from the report if  
this problem, both in the negotiation and ratification 
processes, was one experienced by Ecuador only with 
respect to its investment treaties, or if  on the contrary, 
it was something that happened to all of  treaties sig-
ned by that country during the nineties36. This is not 
a minor concern, because it could help to clarify whe-
ther the problem was that those treaties were actually 
imposed on Ecuador, or rather that the country lacked 
the technical capacity to assess any type of  important 
agreement, not only those related to investment. Two 
observations can be further elaborated in this regard. 
First, the quality of  the consent of  the host state 
touches on one of  the pillars of  the conceptual fra-
mework of  international law since the very beginning 
of  the discipline, and that is that ‘nations are free, indepen-
33  See Poulsen, Lauge Skovgaard and Aisbett, Emma. “When 
the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational 
Learning”, World Politics, 65 No. 2 (2013).
34  CAITISA Report,  supra n. xiv, at 15.
35  Ibid. at 17.
36  For a broader study on how developing countries often ignored 
the risks of  bilateral investment treaties (BITs) until they themselves 
became subject to an investment treaty claim see Poulsen, Lauge N. 
Skovgaard and Aisbett, Emma. “When the Claim Hits: Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning”, World politics, 
65 No. 2 (2013). See also Gus Van Harten, “Five Justifications for 
Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion.” Trade, Law and Devel-
opment 2  No 1 (2010) 19-58.
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dent, and equal’37. These premises allow us to structure a 
legal system where the legal equality of  its actors (states) 
is reflected in the capacity to possess the same rights 
and obligations. An argument can be made that this de 
jure equality might not reflect the de facto asymmetries in 
specialized information —and the methods for proces-
sing that information—  that exist between developed 
and developing countries, especially as treaty matters 
become ever more complex (e.g. international taxation, 
finance, etc.)
However, this asymmetry in technical information, 
is not exclusively a problem for international invest-
ment treaties, but rather one of  the major challenges to 
the international legal system as we know it, because it 
empowers epistemic communities that do not necessa-
rily belong to a nation state, but that are transversal in 
their formation and can influence the text of  interna-
tional legal rules. 
The second observation on the consent argument 
is the global context of  the investment regime. During 
the nineties when most of  these treaties were negotia-
ted, arbitral jurisprudence was in its infancy. The AAPL 
case38, the first known investor arbitration case, was de-
cided in 1990, but it was only in the first decade of  this 
century that its impact was evaluated by the doctrine39. 
The same can be said of  the Fair and Equitable Stan-
dard of  Treatment, since its first use in a process was in 
the year 200140, and it was only after the controversial 
NAFTA cases that it became one of  the ‘hot topics’ of  
investment arbitration. From this perspective, it was not 
only the Ecuadorian negotiators or legislators that did 
not assess the possible consequences of  their treaties; 
All countries, even developed ones, suffered from this 
lack of  awareness of  the regime during the nineties.
Another set of  criticisms made in the CAITISA re-
37  Emer Vattel, The  Law of  Nations or Principles of  the Law of  
Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of  Nations and Sovereigns, Le 
Droit Des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle (London: Clarke, 
1811), at  liii.
38  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v Republic of  Sri Lanka, 
International Centre for the Settlement of  Investment Disput ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/31990, para 18.
39  See James Thuo Gathii, “War’s Legacy in International Invest-
ment Law,” International Community Law Review, Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers 11 (2009).
40  It is believed that the first use on a process of  the standard 
was in Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of  Spain, see Rudolf  
Dolzer, “Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours,” Santa 
Clara Journal of  International Law 12 Issue 1 Symposium on the Law 
and Politics of  Foreign Investment (2014), at 10.
port addresses a series of  substantive points that have 
been made about the regime over the last few years. For 
instance, the report analyzes the problems regarding 
specific provisions of  standards of  treatment, most re-
markably the Fair and Equitable Standard41 and explains 
how arbitrators in some Ecuadorian cases have reached 
different contradictory conclusions42. Also, the report 
puts special emphasis on the ‘double hatting’ problem in 
arbitration43, referring to conflicts of  interest that can ari-
se when actors play multiple roles within the investment 
regime. These criticisms, while important, have already 
been documented44 and debated not only by the doctrine 
but most importantly, they have been debated multilate-
rally, also by Ecuador, in the different UNCTAD45 fora.  
3.  the questIons thAt lIe beneAth the 
cAItIsA report And the termInAtIon of 
bIts In 2017
The CAITISA report, notwithstanding the useful 
information compiled about the historical Ecuadorian 
experience on the international investment regime that 
was briefly commented on in the previous section, has 
an important downside: The time of  its release, and 
some of  its methodological choices. 
First, the report was released almost ten years af-
ter the initial political decision was taken by the Ecua-
dorian constitutional assembly of  Montecristi, about 
41  CAITISA Report,  supra n. xiv, at 18.
42  On this point, the report documented the problem of  differ-
ent tribunals arriving at different conclusions while interpreting the 
same law (Ley 42), see ibid at 39-40.
43  CAITISA Report,  supra n. xiv, at 50-62.
44  For an analysis of  legitimacy of  contradictory arbitral decisions 
see for instance S. D. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through In-
consistent Decisions,” Fordham Law Review 73, no. 4 (2005).; Stephan 
Schill, “Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: 
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of  a New Public Law 
Approach,” Virginia Journal Of  International Law Vol 52 (2011). For 
an analsis of  the ‘double hatting’ issue in international investment 
practice see the most recent study of   Malcolm Langford, Daniel 
Behn, Runar Hilleren Lie. “The Revolving Door in International In-
vestment Arbitration.” Journal of  International Economic Law Vol 
20 (2017) 301-332.
45  UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment, “IIA 2013, Issue Note  No. 3: Reform of  Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: in Search of  a Roadmap “ (2013); “World In-
vestment Report 2012 - UNCTAD,”  (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, 2012).
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seven years after the first set of  Ecuadorian Constitu-
tional Court judgments on the matter, and what seems 
more intriguing two years after the same commission 
had concluded its work. In relation to the latter point, 
the report contains a short statement included in one 
of  the footnotes: 
‘The Commission completed its work in May 2015, 
despite this, an update was made on the situation of  
the investor claims ‘46.
This short sentence raises more questions. The first 
one is that according to this information the CAITISA 
commission finished its work in 2015, but the report 
was presented to the public in 2017, two years later. 
This statement reveals that even when the report was 
ready, the commission decided to keep the information 
on its findings away from the public by deciding not to 
release it for a considerable time. 
The reasons for this decision are unclear but, at first 
glance, a point can be made that the release of  the in-
formation, and the final decision to terminate the remai-
ning 16 BITs, came months after the EU and Ecuador 
had ratified the treaty of  accession to the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between Colombia, Peru and the EU. 
It could be argued that it would have been more di-
fficult for Ecuador to achieve the ratification of  its FTA 
with the EU, if  the BITs with key EU member states 
—Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Fran-
ce, Spain and Italy— had been terminated by Ecuador 
before the EU Parliament decided on the accession of  
Ecuador to the FTA on December 2016.  This also in-
dicates that there is still much to learn from the impact 
that an Investment treaty might have outside the scope 
of  investment, and more concretely, how investment 
treaties improve (or not) the political relations between 
countries, and how they can prepare the ground for 
deeper commercial agreements.
Second, the report is affected by an important me-
thodological choice used in their investigations; it re-
moved from its inquiry the impact of  the decision to 
disconnect itself  from the regime in 2008.  With this 
choice, the report effectively avoids answering the main 
question that Ecuador needed to ask in the year 2017: 
What was the impact of  the decision to exit the regime, 
a decision enforced by article 422 in the new constitu-
tion and implemented over the last decade? 
46  CAITISA Report,  supra n. xiv, Footnote 19.
In other words, by the year 2017, Ecuador did not 
need another legal, sociological and moral assessment 
of  the investment regime and its problems, because the 
country had already taken the political decision to aban-
don this regime a decade ago. What the country urgently 
needed was to know the impact of  the decision, rather 
than why there were ‘good reasons’ to abandon the regi-
me, in the same way that a patient wants to know from a 
doctor the results of  his/her surgery rather than expla-
nations of  why the surgery was needed in the first place. 
The report does shed some light on the situation of  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ecuador, since it 
concludes that FDI arriving in Ecuador is ‘reduced’47 a 
word that is conservative considering that the same re-
port acknowledges that the flow of  capital coming into 
Ecuador during the period from 2000 to 2013 was only 
0.79% of  the total amount of  FDI that arrived in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, placing Ecuador 29th out 
of  the 32 countries in this regard in Latin America48.
The situation of  Ecuador seems even more alarming 
if  the data released by UNCTAD is considered. From 
this data, we learn that FDI arriving in Ecuador repre-
sents only 0.5% of  the total arriving in South America 
during the chaotic period of  disengagement with the 
regime (2006 to 2017), a considerably smaller amount 
than that of  its two neighbors49, Peru and Colombia, 
which have greatly outperformed Ecuador’s economy 
in this regard.  Along these lines, a legitimate inquiry 
would rather be how much article 422, the contradic-
tory judgements of  the constitutional court, the denun-
ciation of  ICSID and BITS affected the disastrous per-
formance of  Ecuador in terms of  capital inflows.
Even more, the main fear of  those who opposed 
drafting article 422 was precisely that it would affect 
the flows of  FDI coming to the country. As expressed 
bluntly by one of  the few drafters that strongly opposed 
article 422:
It would be severe for the country, [...] to isolate us 
from these [...] mechanisms that exist in the world. 
47  Ibid at 63.
48  Ibid.
49   The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of  Ecuador represents 
a range that varies between 6 to 10 % of  the FDI of   Peru and Co-
lombia during the period 2006 to 2016. See the different data con-
tained in UNCTAD WIR17 World Investment Report 2017: UNC-
TAD WIR16 World Investment Report 2016; UNCTAD WIR15 
World Investment Report 2015; UNCTAD WIR14 World Invest-
ment Report 2014: UNCTAD WIR13 World Investment Report 
2013; UNCTAD WIR12 World Investment Report 2012.
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It’s not WE the ones who are going to change the 
world pretending that these mechanisms do not 
exist. People in the world will not care that Ecuador 
does not want to go into arbitration, what they 
are going to say is: gentlemen, you do not want 
to go into arbitration, we do not want to have 
relationships with you. [...]50
The CAITISA report by removing the impact of  
the new constitution as a key variable of  the study of  
Ecuador’s investment policy and flows of  FDI missed the 
opportunity to assess the Ecuadorian experience com-
prehensively. Any country that is seeking to either reform 
or exit the investment regime, in a well-informed way, 
should look beyond the CAITISA report in this regard.
4. the use of the constItutIonAl sphere In 
InternAtIonAl Investment ArbItrAtIon 
The Ecuadorian experience shows the unique nature 
of  international investment law, where an arbitral tribu-
nal not only resolves disputes, but exercises a unique 
type of  public authority51 that overlaps with that of  the 
state. Like any authority, it needs to be legitimized in 
the social field where it is exercised. Under this concep-
tion, the process of  legitimation implies the ability of  
the investment arbitration system to generate a ‘pull of  
self-compliance’52 that occurs when ‘good reasons’53 are 
given for accepting someone else’s authority, whether 
those reasons are sociological, legal or moral54. 
These ‘good reasons’ in the case of  international in-
vestment arbitration were based on utilitarian grounds 
that fall between moral and social reasons. This means 
that countries accepted the insertion of  arbitration 
50  Personal translation of  the speech pronounced by the drafter 
Pablo Lucio-Paredes, Transcripts of  the discussions of  article 422, 
Ecuador Constitutional Assembly [Asamblea Constituyente Ecua-
dor] Acta 038 Sumario  - 22 April, 2008 
51  See, Armin Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? A 
Public Law Theory of  International Adjudication (Oxford University 
Press 2014).
52  Thomas M. Franck, “The Power of  Legitimacy and the Le-
gitimacy of  Power: International Law in an Age of  Power Disequi-
librium,” The American Journal of  International Law 100, No. 1 (2006), 
at 20.
53   Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Paradigms of  Inter-
national Law, Armin von Bogdandy and Sergio Dellavalle in  Mor-
timer N. S. Sellers, Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Foundations of  
International Law, Asil Studies in International Legal Theory (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), at 47.
54  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. “Legitimacy and the Constitution”, 
Harvard Law Review 118 (2005), 1787-2921.
clauses in the first place because they were expecting a 
benefit, whether it was an increase in investment flows 
or like many small economies, the promise of  develo-
pment. If  investment arbitration stops providing tho-
se reasons the pull of  self-compliance fades away. In 
this case, compliance can only be achieved exclusively 
by coercion, which in investment arbitration means the 
different processes used to enforce awards. 
Unlike many regimes of  international law, investment 
arbitration possesses a well-designed legal structure for 
enforcing decisions relying on the national law of  the 
different states, the ICSID and New York Conventions. 
Notwithstanding the efficiency of  this enforcement me-
chanism, a system cannot rely entirely on coercion, whi-
ch can sooner or later provoke a process of  resistance.
The Ecuadorian Constitutional process of  Monte-
cristi in 2008 illustrates this point. Once an internatio-
nal regime, such as the investment one, stops generating 
‘good reasons’ for the population of  the host state to 
comply with it, a process of  resistance could occur. For 
that reason, the deeper inquiry not only into the legal 
text of  the Ecuadorian constitution that entered into 
force in 2008, but also into the reasons expressed during 
the drafting process of  Article 422, were useful. Because 
this process revealed the real reasons that led to a break 
with the system, not the ones expressed ten years later.
In the different discussions of  article 422 of  the 
Ecuadorian constitution, it is possible to distinguish a 
three-element discourse used by some of  the Ecuado-
rian drafters to resist international investment arbitra-
tion. The first is that investment arbitration is perceived 
as part and parcel of  other categories of  international 
economic governance. 
In fact, during the discussions by the Ecuadorian 
constitutional assembly, there were plenty of  examples55 
that illustrated how in the same arguments references to 
institutions such as ‘ICSID’, ‘IMF’, ‘WTO’, World Bank’ 
were used interchangeably as if  all of  them were a single 
body, system or concept. This is a reminder that the aca-
demic lines drawn by legal experts can sometimes fade 
away in public discourse, and the failures of  one pillar of  
economic governance will ‘de facto’ affect others.
The second element in the Ecuadorian constitutio-
nal discourse is the strong idea of  exclusion from the 
55  Asamblea Constituyente del Ecuador (2008) Acta no. 038 and 
Acta No.51.
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systems of  globalization and transnationalism by an ex-
ternal “other” (e.g. the elite, multinational corporations’, 
etc.). The perceived exclusion by this “other” whether it 
was referred to as “the multinationals” or “ICSID” was 
described in specifically economic terms.
Finally, a third element is the search for a metho-
dological refuge from this ‘other’ inside the absolute 
conception of  the sovereignty of  the nation-state. This 
means that in the logic of  this discourse there is an idea 
that the absolute power of  the state should prevail on 
economic matters. This three-element discourse can be 
better illustrated by looking at some of  the reasons sta-
ted behind the Ecuadorian process of  2008, for exam-
ple the following lines:
‘With regard to international arbitration, a 
globalizing order is evident in the world, in the last 
decades, where it is said that there are no frontiers, 
especially for capital; And, International Law 
instead of  defending life, the People, the human 
being, defends the interests of  capital and the 
multinationals, that is why instruments such as the 
famous ICSID which protects foreign investment, 
must be rejected by the people […] That is why 
we must recover; National sovereignty also implies 
that we do not submit to this type of  arbitration 
[referring to international investment arbitration].’56 
However, the experience of  Ecuador can also illus-
trate the difficulties of  using the constitutional sphere to 
disengage from the investment regime, especially when 
there is no clear course of  action planned before the 
actual decision is taken. This lack of  planning cannot be 
better illustrated that with the conclusions of  the CAI-
TISA report that sketch guidelines57 for an Ecuadorian 
model of  investment agreement. There is no problem 
with these ideas of  reform, but what is notable is that 
so many years after the decision, there is still not even a 
model of  a treaty on the part of  the Ecuadorians with 
which to take on any new negotiations. 
While it is clear that social discontent can trigger 
constitutional responses to international economic go-
vernance, as has happened not only in Ecuador but also 
in Venezuela and Bolivia, in these cases, it seems that a 
more appropriate way to process such reactions is by 
insertion of  principles rather than by rules containing 
prohibitions as in the Ecuadorian case. There are at 
least three good reasons why the use of  principles re-
56   Personal translation of  the intervention of  the drafter Geo-
vanny Atarihuana, Transcripts of  the discussions of  Art. 422 of  the 
Ecuadorian Constitutional Assembly. Acta No.038, 22 April 2008.
57  CAITISA Report,  supra n. xiv, at 100-103.
presents an advantage.
First, since constitutions are supposed to be designed 
for the long term, it is easier to use principles to adapt 
to the needs of  different generation’s foreign investment 
policy needs. If  a rigid and ambiguous prohibition is in-
serted as in the case of  Ecuador, then it could limit the 
range of  policy choices for future generations, who will 
have to either find loopholes in the provision, or seek 
to reform it. For instance, if  the ambitious multilateral 
project of  an investment court advances, Ecuador will 
have to again change its constitution to be a part of  it.
In addition, a second reason is that principles could 
transform social needs into a legal language. This mean 
that once a principle has been inserted in a constitution 
it has already transformed a specific social problem into 
a legal obligation, that can eventually be addressed in a 
legal process or influence the drafting of  a treaty.
In consequence, a third reason is that a constitutio-
nal text could be a more powerful tool to influence in-
ternal change in a regime. This is because it ismore likely 
that principles that represent social choices transformed 
into legal language, will be transported to the interna-
tional legal sphere, either by influencing the text of  new 
treaties, or by supporting specific legal arguments in a 
particular arbitration process. 
Finally, the Ecuadorian case highlights the important 
role that Constitutional Judges can have when they inte-
ract with the regime.  The vast majority of  Investment 
Treaties celebrated during the nineties did not undergo 
the high levels of  constitutional scrutiny at the natio-
nal level that new treaties during the last five years have 
received. For that reason, interactions between consti-
tutional judges and arbitrators are a new legal pheno-
menon worth exploring. In this regard, the Ecuadorian 
experience illustrates the dual functions that Constitu-
tional judges can serve in this interplay: First, is the ob-
vious internal task of  controlling the constitutionality 
—within the legal framework of  the host state— of  the 
specific Investment treaty brought to the Court’s consi-
deration. However, a second function is generating legal 
discourses that could engage investment arbitrators in 
judicial dialogue. It is as part of  this second unexplored 
function that a constitutional judge gains social legiti-
macy, as well as the legal standing to define new princi-
ples that can be used by arbitrators.
The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court missed the 
opportunity to exercise this second systemic function, 
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because they did not develop a uniform legal discour-
se, even arriving at different judgments as was pointed 
out above. One of  the reasons for this inconsistency 
in judgements is that without knowing, the Ecuadorian 
judges where probably among the first constitutional 
judges to have the opportunity to interact with the in-
vestment regime. However, their experience is valuable 
for understanding these new kinds of  interactions whi-
ch take place ever more frequently on the global stage
5. conclusIon 
The International Investment Law regime has been 
undergoing a process of  deep transformation at different 
levels. There is a consensus on the need to reform the re-
gime, with current debates centering on the best methods 
for such reform. The termination of  investment treaties 
in Ecuador probably represents the most drastic of  the-
se methods, and using the constitutional sphere to effect 
this termination could have long-term consequences. The 
Ecuadorian experience demonstrates that establishing a 
well-informed, pre-defined legal course of  action is funda-
mental before measures of  this kind are taken. Also, that 
the use of  the constitutional sphere to effect reform might 
benefit a country more if  it is aimed at the construction of  
principles to be applied in investment rather than at rules 
establishing prohibitions of  any kind. In any case, whether 
a country is considering terminating its existing BITs, or is 
more generally investigating the transformation of  the in-
ternational investment regime, the Ecuadorian experience 
constitutes one of  the few experiments in termination and 
deserves further study in all its complexity.
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